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Abstract 
The partial privatization of the US Social Security system was clearly the top economic policy 
priority for the new Bush administration. While many famous economists, publicists and 
politicians support, others reject the partial privatization of the Social Security system. The 
international comparisons have been quite infrequent, concentrated on few countries (Chile, 
Great Britain and Sweden) and left out similar reforms introduced in similar situations, like 
in Hungary, Poland and other ex-communist countries. In this article I try to make up for 
this omission and outline the lessons from the Hungarian reform, started in 1998. The 
conclusion is simple: such a reform is possible but does not solve the problems of social 
security. 
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 A társadalombiztosítási rendszer reformja az Egyesült 




Az amerikai tb részleges privatizálása volt az új Bush-kormányzat első számú 
gazdaságpolitikai célja. Számos neves közgazdász, publicista és politikus támogatja, mások 
elutasítják a tb részleges privatizálását. Kevés nemzetközi összehasonlítás született, azok is 
csak néhány országra (Chile, Nagy Britannia és Svédország) szorítkoztak, és figyelmen kívül 
hagytak hasonló reformokat, amelyeket hasonló körülmények között vezettek be 
(Magyarország, Lengyelország és más posztkommunista ország). Ebben a cikkben 
megkísérlem pótolni a jelzett hiányt és az 1998-ban bevezetett magyar reformból levonni a 
tanulságokat. A következtetés egyszerű: ilyen reform lehetséges, de nem oldja meg a tb 
gondjait. 
Tárgyszavak:  





The partial privatization of the US Social Security (for short, US SS) system was clearly the 
top economic policy priority for the new Bush administration. While many prominent 
economists, public commentators, and politicians support partial privatization of the SS 
system, others reject it with equal fervor. International comparisons have invoked countries 
such as Chile, Great Britain and Sweden to evaluate the US SS reform but have overlooked 
more relevant reforms in Hungary, Poland and other ex-communist countries (cf. Müller, 
1999; Müller et al., eds., 1999 and Fultz, ed., 2002.) In this article I try to make up for this 
omission and outline the lessons from the Hungarian reform initiated in 1998.  
Of course, no two countries are exactly alike, and the USA, moreover, is a country in a 
class of its own. No two pension systems are identical, either (cf. e.g. World Bank, 1994 and 
Holzmann and Stiglitz, eds., 2001). Nevertheless, the initial situations at the start of reform 
in the US and Hungary and the plans that evolved  share many similarities. Concerning the 
initial situation and the reform plan, the US, in fact, shares more features with Hungary than 
with the countries with which it is frequently compared. 
The essential similarities between the initial situations in Hungary and the US can be 
quickly summarized. Each country had, or has, a universal and progressive public pension 
system (i.e. redistributive from the richer to the poorer) that provides the bulk of support in 
old age for the bulk of the pensioners. There is a quite wide consensus that the old system 
sooner or later stands in need of an important reform. The essential similarities between the 
two reforms can be summarized with equal ease. The contribution rate to the mandatory 
system is fixed. In Hungary, a significant, though not dominant share was carved out for the 
private, funded pillar. The reform proposal in the US carries a similar provision. In both 
cases, the public pillar is parametrically reformed as to lower considerably the benefit–
contribution ratio. Participation in the private system is semivoluntary. The transition cost 
that remains after the parametric reform and that arise as a result of the diversion of 
contributions from Pillar 1 to the new individual accounts is financed from general revenues. 
There are as well important differences between the two systems and their reforms. The 
US system has a huge trust fund, while the Hungarian system has no such reserves. The US 
public system is complemented by a semi-voluntary (employer) pension system, in which 
about half of all American workers participate, some of whom accumulate significant 
savings. In Hungary, the voluntary system started only in 1993 and most of the participants 
have rather modest pension savings. In the US the proposed reform retains the progressivity 
of the current system, while the Hungarian reform is dropping it. Furthermore, the US  
parametric reform will eventually freeze the real value of even the entry pension benefits, 
while the continued benefits are frozen in most pension systems. In contrast, the Hungarian 
reform prescribes that the real value of entry pensions in Hungary keep up with wages, while 
the real value of continued pensions grows at half that rate. 
This comparison is obviously rudimentary. The following account will provide the needed 
elaboration. The punch line, which I offer here rather than withhold it until the end, is: 
partial privatization of the social security is possible but not helpful. 
The next section of the paper outlines the present state of the US SS system. Section 3 
presents the President's Commission plan as of 2002; Section 4 discusses the prereform 
state of the Hungarian SS system; Section 5 displays the partial privatization of the 
Hungarian pension system; Section 6 evaluates the Hungarian reform. In Section 7, I 
compare the two cases and in Section 8 offer some conclusions. Those who know the US or 
the Hungarian system, may drop Sections 2-3 or Sections 4-6, respectively. 
 
THE US SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, 2003 
 
There is an enormous literature on the US SS system and it would be pointless here to 
attempt a recapitulation. It is characteristic, however, that various authors, depending on 
their perspective and predisposition, view the US system as either attractive (Diamond, 
2004; Diamond and Orszag, 2004 and 2005, for example) or depressing (Feldstein, 2005a, 
b). On the basic facts there is much greater agreement than in their evaluations. The account 
below follows Diamond and Orszag (2004, pp. 14–26). 
Every employee pays the SS system 6.2% on the portion of his gross wage below a ceiling 
that rises over time. (In 2003 the ceiling was $87,000.) The employer pays an equal amount. 
In principle, workers retire at the full benefit age, which was 65 years and 8 months in 2003 
(and rising). Euphemistically this quantity is called normal retirement age but the bulk of 
the workers retires before reaching this age. The full benefit is calculated by multiplying the 
individual nominal gross earnings by the annual nationwide average gross wage index. The 
best 35 years are selected and their average, divided by 12, determines the average indexed 
monthly earning, the AIME. Using a piecewise linear function with slopes 0.90; 0.32 and 
0.15, in the intervals ($0, $606); ($606, $3,653) and above $3,653,  respectively, the AIME 
is transformed into the primary insurance amount, or PIA. Workers cannot receive benefits 
before the minimal retirement age, fixed at 62. Those who claim their benefits before 
reaching the full benefit age have a PIA reduced according to actuarial principles. For 
example, a person who claims his benefit in 2003 at age 62, has a benefit 23.33% lower than 
  
his PIA. Those who claim their benefit after reaching the full benefit age enjoy a credit for 
delayed retirement. For example, a 70-year-old who retires in 2008 will receive a monthly 
benefit which is 32.5% higher than the PIA. The benefits of those who already retired 
increase every year according to the consumer price index and are paid until death: indexed 
unisex life annuity.  
For workers who qualify for disability benefits, the AIME is calculated over the relevant 
working period. As for family benefits, retirement of a spouse of a retiree who reaches age 62 
without an independent SS benefit or with a benefit lower than half that of the retired spouse 
results in the payment to the couple of a benefit that is 150% of the higher benefit. The 
spouse of a deceased worker may claim a survivor’s benefit, the amount depending on the 
age of the widow(er) and on the age of the deceased worker when he first claimed his benefit. 
A child under age 18 who survives a deceased worker receives 75 percent of that worker's PIA 
until age 18. (There are some limits on these benefits.) The SS benefits are partially taxed 
and the tax revenue flows to the SS and Medicare Trust Funds. 
Before turning to the future of the US SS system, we should note the role of SS in old-age 
security. "[SS] represents 90 percent or more of total income for  almost one-third of elderly 
beneficiaries. . … [SS] benefits account for more than half of total income for almost two-
thirds of beneficiaries over age 65." (Diamond and Orszag, 2004, p. 15). For those with large 
private savings and generous private pensions, SS benefits are not essential or dominant. 
Characteristically, the total of private pension contributions approximately equals that of SS 
contributions. 
There is agreement among the representatives of the differing schools of thought that the 
US SS needs an overhaul. This agreement reflects recognition that sometime around the year 
2018 the Trust Fund, in all likelihood, will cease to grow, begin to shrink, and around 2042, 
be exhausted. If the current rules are not changed much before 2042, then the benefits will 
of necessity be dramatically reduced or the payroll tax rates dramatically increased.  
Diamond and Orszag  (2004, 55–78) offer three major explanations for this deficit in the 
balances of the SS system. The first is increasing life expectancy at age 65. Although the full 
benefit age is increasing, the improvement in life expectancy is faster than planned, thus 
creating a deficit while actuarial adjustment prevents further reductions. The second 
explanation is increasing earnings inequality. Though the SS contribution has an indexed 
ceiling, the increasing average real earnings and especially the increasing earnings inequality 
has raised the share in national income of aggregate earnings above the ceiling, from about 
10% in 1983 to 17% in 2000. The first and the second causes interact: the improvement in 
life expectancy is much faster among the rich than among the poor even for the older 
population but less sharply than for the younger population. The third factor is the existence 
  
of the  legacy debt, defined as the present value of the benefits less the present value of the 
contributions of the early beneficiaries (born before 1936). Its current value in 2002 dollars 
is about 12 trillion dollars and must be financed by later beneficiaries (born since 1936). 
Something needs to be done to claw back some of the pension promises. This is called 
pension reform. There are, however, many ways to effect pension reform and decades will 
pass before we can know whether the path chosen was the right one. 
There is the “tune it up, don’t trade it in” approach of economists (Aaron and Reischauer, 
2001 and Diamond and Orszag, 2004, for example) who are convinced that so-called 
parametric reform of the SS system is sufficient to save it. The basic idea of Diamond and 
Orszag (2004), for example, is to reduce the benefit dynamic while increasing the 
contribution rate and increase normal retirement age even faster than prescribed in the 
actual law, splitting the burden of adjustment between relative benefit reduction and an 
increase in contributions. In addition, they propose some further improvement in the social 
insurance function of the SS system, but its outline is beyond the scope of the present paper.  
Proponents of privatization (e.g., Kotlikoff, 1997; Feldstein and Samwick, 2002; and 
Feldstein, 2005a, b) do not accept that any parametric reform is sufficient or suitable for 
strengthening the old-age insurance system. As is known, already in his first presidency, 
George W. Bush appointed a committee (the President's Commission, 2002) charged with 
the outlining a reform of the SS system through partial privatization. As the reelected 
president, Bush immediately announced that he pushes his original plan. 
Before closing this Section, I would like to make three remarks on life-cycle issues in the 
US: 
a)  One cannot expect that poor workers will happily contribute to pension funds that 
earn interest rates of 9% per year while paying twice that in interest charges on 
credit card debt (e.g., Gill et al., 2005). It would be much more helpful to convince 
and help these persons to use much less these expensive credits that will leave 
them sufficient savings at retirement. 
b)  The sustained, rapid growth of US housing prices makes it possible for even the 
richer groups of the US workers to finance excessive consumption through home 
equity loans.  If personal private saving is financed from such a source, then the 
introduction of private pension accounts does not increase total savings (Vittas, 
1997). Note that the repayment of this type of loans enjoys tax relief, achieving 
perverse income redistribution from the poor to the rich. 
c)  If the US government is concerned by the growing future public burden, the 
simplest thing would be to slow the spectacular rise of the US foreign debt. 
 
  
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION PLAN 
 
Of course, the situation of the US economy in 2005 is rather different from that in 2002, 
when the President's Commission published its plans and additional time will be needed to 
legislate such a long-term reform. Nevertheless, we have no better choice than to refer to the 
2002 plan. 
In 2001, President Bush put forward six principles to which the Committee should 
adhere: 
1.  "Modernization must not change benefits of [current] retirees and near retirees." 
2.  "The entire Social Security surplus must be dedicated to Social Security only." 
3.  "The Social Security payroll tax rate must not be increased." 
4.  "Government must not invest Social Security funds in the stock market." 
5.  "Modernization must preserve Social Security disability and survivors' 
components." 
6.  "Modernization must include individually controlled, voluntary personal 
retirement accounts, which augment the Social Security safety net." 
The President's Committee presented three plans but we shall deal only with the second, 
considered the most relevant. The basic idea is to carve out 4% of gross wage, i.e. about 1/3 
of total contributions up to an annual maximum $1,000 and put it to an individual account. 
To preserve the progressivity of the combined system and assure that participation is 
advantageous, a complex mechanism would connect the reduction of the SS benefit with the 
fresh individual one at retirement. To save on menacing operating costs (Murthi et al., 
2001), an individual account will not be individually managed until its assets reach a 
significant sum, say $5,000, where the relative operating costs cease to be unbearable. To 
enhance the appeal of  the combined system, the assets held in individual accounts can be 
inherited by the survivors until the owner’s retirement. The obscure gimmick in the reform is 
the introduction of indexing the AIME to reflect changes in prices rather than wages, a 
change that would yield savings  t o  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  S S  p i l l a r  b y  d r a s t i c a l l y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  
replacement and contribution rates. 
In order to clarify the differences between the two approaches, I present a simplified 
comparison between the two plans. As Diamond and Orszag note, the private benefit of the 
combined system is much riskier than the public part. Moreover, there is no agreement 
among economists as to how to take this difference into account. At the extremes, it is 
possible to ignore the difference between risks or fully take them into account. The reality 
lies possibly much closer to the second than to the first option.  
  
 
Table 1.  
Changes in Benefits for Average-Earning Two-Earner Couples: Diamond–
Orszag's Proposal and President's Commission Model 2: percent change from 
scheduled benefits 
   








not adjusted  





2012    –0.0    –0.9     0.0    –0.5 
2022    –0.6    –9.9   –6.1    –8.5 
2032    –3.7  –18.2   –8.3  –15.2 
2042    –7.8  –25.7   –5.9  –20.5 
2052 –11.7 –32.5    –6.3 –26.1 
2075 –19.7  –45.9  –20.5  –39.6 
Source: Diamond and Orszag (2003), Table F-2, p. 222.  
 
By way of illustration, the last row of Table 1 shows the benefits of those who turn 65 in 
2075. According to the Diamond–Orszag plan, they would lose about 20% with respect to 
the present, unsustainable system. According to the President's Commission plan, those 
remaining in the traditional system, would lose 46%. For those who join the combined 
system, the loss will be 20 or 40%, depending on whether the risk in the private benefit is 
taken into account. It is worth mentioning that even in the optimistic (first) case, the loss is 
equal to that in the Diamond–Orszag plan (though without paying an increased payroll tax 
rate) and in the pessimistic and more realistic (second) case, the loss is double. 
There are serious problems with the President's Commission plan. Most importantly,  
1.  It would significantly reduce the replacement rate of the remaining SS 
component. 
2.  With inheritability of the individual accounts many elderly will receive lower 
benefits than without, since the assets passed on as an inheritance will be lost to 
the pension system 
3.  Personal, individually managed accounts carry considerable risk and are not 
insured against the worst outcomes. 
Some economists, it should be noted, who favor privatization but still consider it 
important to separate parametric and structural reform, propose a hybrid indexation of the 
  
public entry benefits rather than eventual freezing. This reform would preserve indexation in 
accordance with wages for those workers with the lowest earnings. (Cf. for example, Scheiber 
a n d  S h o v e n  i n  P o s e n  e t  a l . ,  2 0 0 4 . )  I t  i s  o f  certain interest that another group of the 
proponents of privatization (Feldstein and Kotlikoff) also favor a (temporary) increase in the 
mandatory contribution rate. 
 
THE HUNGARIAN SOCIAL SECURITY UNTIL 1998 
 
Since there are strong differences of opinion concerning the impact of SS privatization, it 
may be helpful to look at a comparable reform of a similar system, not so much that of Chile, 
Great Britain or Sweden, but of Hungary in 1998. In the next three Sections we shall discuss 
the Hungarian SS system before, during, and after the reform. Since my only objective is to 
contribute to the evaluation of the proposed US SS reform, I will skip details that have no 
relevance to the comparison. (For details on the Hungarian case, see Augusztinovics and 
Martos (1995), Palacios and Rocha (1998), Augusztinovics (1999), Simonovits (2001), 
Augusztinovics et al. (2002), Rocha and Vittas (2002) and Gál and Tarcali (2003).)  
Hungary is a middle-sized and middle-income country of some 10 million inhabitants 
with PPP per-capita GDP of about 56% of the EU-15 average in 2002. By now, the bulk of the 
economy has been privatized and after reaching the trough of the transformational 
depression in 1993, has been developing significantly more rapidly than the EU-15. In May 
2004, Hungary joined the EU with 9 other countries, mostly excommunist ones. 
Hungary is an aging country, with low fertility and relatively high age-specific adult 
mortality rates. As a result, the old-age demographic dependency rate was about 40% in 
1994 and is expected to rise to 52% by 2030, not dramatic, particularly when  one takes 
account of the low full benefit ages of 1994, namely 55 for women and 60 for men.  
During the communist era, Hungary had built up a generous SS system, which was 
universal and which was combined with a similar ,  p u b l i c l y  p r o v i d e d  h e a l t h  s y s t e m  ( c f .  
Bokros and Dethier, eds. 1998). By 1990, the ratio of public pension expenditures to GDP 
reached 10% and has remained around this value. (This is about twice the corresponding US 
value but only about two-thirds of that of Poland or Italy.) As an important legacy of the 
communist approach, the public pension system was highly progressive: higher earnings and 
longer employment increased the entry benefits (PIA) much less than proportionally and due 
to insufficient indexation of higher benefits, the dispersion of the benefits in progress 
diminished with the time elapsing from retirement. 
  
During the privatization of the economy, the employment rate (for age-group 15–64 
year) dropped drastically (from 76% in 1989 to 60% in 1993) and has barely increased since. 
This change hit the pension system from two sides: various groups in the labor force chose 
early retirement, particularly the unemployed and those working in the hidden economy, 
significantly increasing the number of the pensioners while reducing the number of 
contributors. A simple consequence of this process was the surge in the so-called system 
dependency ratio, that is, the ratio of the number of pensioners to the number of workers, 
from 51% to 84%.  (Warning: this number contains not only proper old-age pensioners but 
survivor and disability beneficiaries as well.) The consequence was direct: the payroll tax 
rates had to be raised and benefit rates had to be cut. 
The transition from socialism to capitalism was accompanied by a significant drop in real 
earnings. In 1992, the appearance of two-digit inflation made the application of wage 
indexation of pension benefits inevitable. While the indexation of pensions more or less 
ensured the relative income position of pensioners with respect to workers, the progressive 
benefit formula of the new pensions gave rise to widespread underreporting of earnings and 
shorter episodes  of contribution. Without going into details, let us emphasize that the 
Hungarian benefit rule is similar to but more cumbersome than the US one. The entry 
benefit (age-adjusted PIA, to be paid to those retired in the given year) is the product of two 
quantities: the reference wage and the index of the number of years of employment, called 
scale. The reference wage is a progressive function of average indexed wages between 1988 
and the year of retirement (an abbreviated version of the US AIME). The scale was also a 
strongly progressive function of the number of years: it started at 33% after 10 years of 
employment  and reached 75% after 40 years, increasing by 2, then by 1%, and finally by 
0.5% per year of additional employment.  
By 1995, a consensus had emerged: the Hungarian pension system needed reform. As in 
the US today, there were two camps in Hungary: (1) those who wanted to keep a pure public 
pension system by introducing parametric reforms (e.g., Augusztinovics and Martos, 1995) 
and (2) those who wanted to replace at least a large part of the public system with a private 
(and funded) pillar (e.g. Palacios and Rocha, 1998). The former were convinced that the 
parametric reforms of the SS system not only necessary but also sufficient. Following the 
ideas of the World Bank (1994), the latter did not accept the sufficiency of such reforms. 
Moderate privatizers considered that partial privatization was necessary to hide the 
parametric reforms from the public, while radical privatizers believed in the superiority of 
any private system over any public one, including pensions, education, health care and 
transportation. (Various transition scenarios are modeled and compared in Simonovits, 
2003, Chapter 15.) 
  
In 1997, Hungary chose the second route to reform: partial privatization. Since then, 
except for the two richest countries, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the bulk of the 
countries in the regions have followed suit. 
 
THE HUNGARIAN PENSION REFORM: 1998 
Here I will elaborate the compressed account of the Hungarian pension reform offered in the 
Introduction. The law adopting private individual accounts was passed by Parliament in the 
s u m m e r  o f  1 9 9 7  a n d  w e n t  i n t o  e f f e c t  o n  J a n u a r y  1 ,  1 9 9 8 .  C o n s i d e r  f i r s t  t h e  p a r a m e t r i c  
reforms and then the systemic ones. 
PARAMETRIC REFORMS 
By definition, the parametric reforms were confined to the public pillar.  
The simplest element of the parametric reform has been the fast increase in 1997 of  the 
full benefit age from 60 to 62 years for men, and for women, progressively from 55 to age 62 
by 2009. As in the US, the entry benefit of those who delay retirement beyond the full benefit 
age, is raised significantly. Those who retire before reaching the full benefit age experience a 
significant reduction. (I note in passing that the rules of transition are so generous that the 
bulk of retirees still retires much in advance of the full benefit age.) 
Since 1998, the progressivity of the entry benefit formula has been steadily diminishing. 
On the one hand, the bend points of the reference wage–earning formula have been 
increasing much more rapidly than prices, thus phasing out this type of progressivity. On the 
other hand, since 1997, the last increment of the scale, the so-called accrual rate was raised 
from 0.5 to 1.5%, lifting the foregoing scale from 75% to 80%  after 40 years of service.  
Currently, the already paid benefits are increased on the basis of combined wage-price 
indexation which in 2000 replaced indexation based on wages alone. Since the initiation of 
the reform measures, as wages have been increasing much more rapidly than prices, 
technical measures have significantly reduced relative pension dynamics. (I note, again in 
passing, that successive governments made important and inconsistent changes in the key 
parameters of the system: reducing the mandatory contribution rates and increasing the 
benefit–contribution ratios, see Gál and Tarcali, 2003, for example.) 
The final state of this evolving system will include a proportional entry benefit, gross 
rather than net, with a uniform accrual of 1.65%. After 40 years of employment, the resulting 
pretax entry benefit will be 66% of the reference gross wage. 
  
SYSTEMIC REFORMS 
From the point of view of our paper, the systemic reforms are more spectacular than the 
parametric reforms. In 1998, Hungary, a pioneer among the excommunist countries in this 
regard, partially privatized its SS system. Rather than adding a new pillar on the top of the 
old SS system, the government carved out a mandatory private pillar from the old system. 
For the members of the combined system, roughly one-quarter (8%) of the total mandatory 
contribution was to be channeled into the private pillar while roughly three-quarters (23%) 
was directed  to the public pillar. 
Initially, there were numerous pension funds. Rapidly, however, the bulk of both capital 
and membership became concentrated in the six biggest firms, each connected with large 
financial institutions – banks or insurance companies. The workers are free  to join any 
pension fund and to switch funds at any time. The funds are required to offer a range of 
portfolios, from conservative to aggressive growth funds. 
As the private pillar is mandatory, the government monitors the operation of the private 
funds: its supervisory board ensures that the funds follow rules. Moreover, originally there 
was a government guaranty behind them that limited members’ loss to 7% of the traditional 
public benefit. With time, this guarantee was discreetly withdrawn. 
Consistent with the mandatory character of the two-pillar system, after 15 years 
participation the private pillar will also pay retirees a life annuity. These annuities must be 
computed on the basis of unisex life expectancy tables. To make the private and the public 
entry benefits comparable, rather surprisingly, the law also requires wage-price indexation of 
private life annuities. 
Rather than separate disability and survivor insurance functions from retirement 
security relegating it to the public domain, proportional fractions of the former were 
transferred into the private domain. Those who become disabled have been given the option 
of returning to the traditional public system. Should the disabled  beneficiary die before 
retirement, his or her heirs can inherit the accumulated capital of the deceased. 
Participation in the mixed system is mandatory for those who enter the labor market 
after June 30, 1998 but optional for those who paid contributions to the SS system before 
1998. Assuming that the mixed system survives, it will be decades before the traditional 
public system disappears. 
Although the reform government preached the superiority of the private system over the 
public one, to save on transition costs, it sought to confine participation to younger cohorts. 
As an automatic tool for limitation, the government framed the transition rules so that 
joiners lost about 1/4 of their contributions to the prereform system. About half of all 
workers joined the mixed system during the transition period which lasted until August 31, 
  
1999. These were drawn predominantly from younger cohorts. According to realistic 
projections, a significant part of those who joined the mixed system will have lost thereby 
(Simonovits, 2003, Table 5.2 and Figure 9.1).  
The most pressing question of such a reform is this: Who will bear the costs of transition? 
By design, the reduction of promises for the traditional and the first pillar benefits 
(parametric reform), and the voluntary chosen benefit loss of the older entrants to the mixed 
system achieve considerable reduction in public benefits. But these reductions do not 
eliminate the temporary gap that arises between current contributions and benefits. The 
government made a promise to finance the cost of transition from general revenues. 
 
EVALUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN REFORM 
GENERAL EVALUATION 
The Hungarian pension reform has passed its seventh birthday and has already accumulated 
considerable experience. Here I would like to summarize aspects of that experience most 
relevant to US reform efforts. 
Partial privatization of a mature and universal public system is possible even in middle-
income countries like Hungary and other exsocialist countries. Judging by the number of 
voluntary joiners, such a transition can be quite popular, at least for a while. In the age of our 
computerized world, even small firms can direct the monthly private contributions of their 
workers to various funds and well-developed pension funds are able to invest these relatively 
small contributions (about 60 dollars/month). 
At the start, it was hoped that partial privatization of the SS system would enhance 
compliance and draw workers back from the gray economy into the "world of labor." It is 
true that participation in any mandatory system strongly depends on the perceived relation 
between individual costs and benefits (Kotlikoff, 1997) and both pillars are much more 
transparent than the old system was. But it was naive to believe (if anyone actually did 
believe) that workers from the gray economy would suddenly report their total earnings, i.e. 
gross earning × (1+ employer's contribution rate) and pay 23% of the gross wage as the 
public pension system plus 15%  of the gross wage as the public health system and the 20-30-
40% of the gross wage as personal income taxes just to participate in the private pension 
fund with the modest 8% contribution! But even if the whole SS system had been privatized 
as in Chile, poor workers could not have afforded any contribution (Gill et al.,  2005). 
  
I do not want to dwell on the specific mistakes of the Hungarian reform, because the US 
reader might think that such errors could not occur in a developed country like the US. I turn 
rather to general problems of relevance to the US blueprint. 
1.  There is an inherent contradiction between the introduction of a private pillar and 
the maintenance of a dominant public pillar. (How can the government expect of 
workers to fully contribute to an "inferior" but dominant first pillar when the 
government has just partially replaced it by a "superior" though dominated 
second pillar?) 
2.  Private funds, especially those based on individual rather than firm membership, 
have high operating costs. (During a period of spectacular economic growth, in 
1998–2004, the Hungarian private pillar paid a real interest rate of zero percent if 
one does not neglect the operation costs proportional to contributions and assets 
as is the case in Hungary.) 
3.  There are very few countries with private life annuities, especially those that pay 
indexed unisex annuities. (In Hungary, the period of 1998–2004 was not long 
enough to plan such an institution!) 
4.  Although the contributions to the private pillar do not constitute personal 
income, they still do not flow into the public treasury or government budget. (In 
2005, the EU authorized the Hungarian government that it can deduct from its 
budget deficit a declining portion of these lost revenues from its official budget, 
starting with 100% of the in 2005 and ending with 20% in 2009.) 
 
LESSONS FROM GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
A basic complaint of the opponents of public systems is that these systems achieve strong 
and unsustainable intergenerational redistribution. In fact, Auerbach et al. (1994) developed 
the Generational Accounts to measure the extent of intergenerational redistribution. The 
core of the method is as follows: pick up a base year (denote it 0) and by fixing the prevailing 
distributional trends and projecting productivity trends, determine the net present value of 
transfers for each generation already born or yet to be born. The long-term government 
budget constraint can necessitate a uniform correction for the net contributions and net 
present values of all future generations. Using this method, it can be shown that in most 
countries the correction factor is much greater than 1, i.e., future generations will have to pay 
much higher detrended lifetime net contributions than the just born generation pays. In 
general, the net contributions comprise all social expenditures but it is possible to confine 
the examination to pensions giving particular emphasis to the gradual transformation of the 
Hungarian pension system started in 1997. 
  
In the present subsection we display such calculations by Gál and Tarcali (2003) 
concerning the Hungarian pension system, revising an earlier calculation by Gál et al. 
(2001). We emphasize the following specifics of these works. 
The generational accounting does not give a forecast but computes the long-run 
consequences of the maintenance of the present trends. It only applies forecasts at a single 
point, namely forecasting demographic processes which are more or less independent of the 
economy. There is no alternative, since according to conventional wisdom, it is aging that is 
the main culprit responsible for intercohort tensions.  
Recapitulating information of earlier sections on the Hungarian pension reform, I 
mention the following facts: 1) the full benefit age is increasing from 55 and 60 years to a 
uniform 62 years between 1997 and 2009; 2) continued pensions are raised by combined 
price-wage indexation from 2000; 3)  progressivity is gradually phased out by 2009, 4) from 
2013 on, the pension scale becomes linear; 5) pensions will be taxable beginning 2013; and 
last but not least, 6) the second pillar was introduced in 1998. 
To get a benchmark, we set out from a base run, assuming that no trend except for 
demography changes. In the base runs, using internationally accepted parameter values, we 
calculated the annual growth rate of productivity (1.5%); the discount rate (5%); and the real 
interest rate (4%). We also made sensitivity calculations. 
Table 2 recapitulates the summary table of Gál and Tarcali (2003), where the reform 
steps are evaluated separately and in combination.  
Table 2.  

































Future 13.6  7.2  7.8  14.8  12.0  10.6  0.6 
Newborn    1.2  3.0  2.1    1.1    1.6    1.2  3.2 
Source: Gál and Tarcali (2003), Table 1.  
 
We omitted the paths of older cohorts, since their accounts do not contain the net 
contributions already paid in, thus their use is limited.  
  In our benchmark we considered the situation prevailing at the beginning of 1998, 
excluding the increase in full benefit age, and taking into account the situation of 2000. 
  
What our results show in this scenario is that a newborn has to contribute 1200 dollars, 
while a typical member of a future cohort must contribute about 13,600 dollars. (Be aware 
that the real dollar-forint exchange rate has recently weakened substantially.)  
Taken in itself, the first and most important step is the introduction of combined price-
wage indexation. This measure alone increases the burden of a newborn by a factor of 2.5 
but halves that of future cohorts. The second step is the completion of raise of full benefit 
age. This measure almost doubles the burden of the newborn, while reducing that of the 
future cohorts by 43%. The phasing out of progressivity and the introduction of a linear 
pension scale are important but not decisive steps. We thus arrive at a measure considered 
as the reform by many experts and nonexperts: the partial prefunding and privatization of 
the pension system. In itself, this measure has a definitely much more modest impact than 
that of the combined indexation: the newborn's burden remains, while the burden of future 
generations eases by 22%.  
Finally let us consider the full impact of the reform. The burden of the newborn is almost 
tripled, while that of the future cohorts almost disappears. Of course, these are only numbers 
and how uncertain they are can be seen from a comparison with the earlier version (Gál et 
al., 2001). The moderate proponents of prefunding and privatization may argue that without 
prefunding and privatization the population would not have accepted the `rationalization' of 
the public system, namely the introduction of combined indexation and the raising of the full 
benefit age. The radical proponents of privatization of the SS system regret that the 
Hungarian government was not able to implement a more radical reform, leaving greater 
room for the second pillar and replacing wage indexation by price indexation. 
Turning from the plans to reality, a recent reassessment of the Hungarian pension 
reform (Orbán and Palotai, 2005) confirmed that the hopes of the reformers have not come 
true. On the one hand, the governments  have sacrificed the financial balance of the first 
pillar at the altar of parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the substandard results of 
the private pension funds would probably diminish the total benefits of the joiners with 




In this section we compare the US and the Hungarian SS systems and their reforms, 
recapitulating our story told so far. To make the comparison more transparent, we index the 
similarities and the differences between the old systems (A and B) and the reforms (C and 
D). Table 3 comprises the keywords. 
  
Table 3  
Comparison of the SSS of the two countries 
SIMILARITIES DIFFERENCES  
  US   Hungary 
PREREFORM    
A1. Universal  B1. Rich country Middle-income  country 
A2. Redistributive: 
progressive 
B2. Huge trust fund  No trust fund 
A3. Low savings  B3. Popular system  Unpopular system 
A4. Unsustainable  B4. Small hidden economy  Large hidden economy 
 B5.  Middle-sized  replacement 
rate 
High replacement rate 
  B6. Price-indexed benefits  Wage-indexed benefits 
  B7. Large "voluntary" pillar  Small voluntary pillar 
REFORM    
C1. Raising the retirement age  D1. Pillar 1 remains 
progressive  
Pillar 1 becomes proportional 
C2. Reduction of the benefit–
contribution ratio from  
Pillar 1 
D2. Price rather than wage-
valorization of AIME 
Wage–price rather than 
wage-indexation of benefits  
C3. Partial privatization   D3. Limited  contribution to 
Pillar 2 
"Unlimited" contribution to 
Pillar 2 
C4. Carve-out   D4. Full recognition of past 
contributions 
Partial recognition of past 
contributions 
C5. Medium-size Pillar 2  D5. Pillar 2 has weak 
guarantees 
Pillar 2 has no guarantees  
C6. Voluntary for workers 
already in the system 
D6. Pillar 2 excludes 
disability benefits 
Pillar 2 includes optional 
disability benefits 
C7. Pillar 2 includes survival 
benefits only after retirement 
D7. Pillar 2 pays minimal life 
annuity 
Pillar 2 pays a normal and 
indexed life annuity 
C8. Deficit financing  D8. The mixed system is also 
optional for beginners 
The mixed system is 
mandatory for beginners 
 
Before the reform, both countries had universal systems, where the current workers paid 
the benefits of the current pensioners (A1). Both countries had progressive systems, where 
on a monthly basis, the more one contributed, the lower was the ratio of the lifetime benefits 
  
to  the lifetime contributions (A2). A large part of the population had no significant source of 
old-age income other than the SS benefit (A3). In the long run, both systems were, or are, 
unsustainable (A4).  
The reforms have increased the full benefit age (C1). The benefit–contribution ratio in 
the reformed SS system is planned to diminish significantly with respect to the prereform 
system (C2). The reformed mandatory system is divided into two parts: a part of the total 
individual contribution is directed into a private account, called Pillar 2, to be invested in 
the stock market or government bonds (C3), while the remaining part flows into the 
reformed SS system, called Pillar 1 (C4).  Per worker contribution to Pillar 2 is about 1/4–1/3 
of the total contribution (C5). In both reforms, the participation in the mixed system is 
optional for workers already employed at the start of the reform (C6). Both reforms limit the 
survivor insurance to the postretirement stage (C7).  Because the redirected contributions 
are diverted from the source of the SS benefits, the resulting deficit is financed from general 
revenues during the long transition period (C8). 
Of course, there are important differences between the US and the Hungarian prereform 
systems and their reforms as well. In the prereformed systems the per capita GDP in the US 
is about three times that of Hungary at purchasing parity prices (B1). There is a huge SS trust 
fund in the US, while there is no trust fund in Hungary (B2). The unreformed system is quite 
popular in the US population, while it was quite unpopular in Hungary (B3). Despite illegal 
immigration, the hidden economy plays a much smaller role in the US than in Hungary (B4). 
The average replacement rate (the ratio of the average net SS benefit to the average net 
wage) in the US is much lower than in Hungary (B5). As is usual in most of the developed 
countries, in the US, every year the SS benefits increase according to prices; while in 
Hungary, it increased according to (falling real) wages (B6).  In the US, already half the 
population contributes to semivoluntary–semimandatory pension funds (employer's plans, 
401(k), etc., see Poterba, 2003), while in Hungary, this sector is still negligible but genuinely 
voluntary and enjoys relatively larger significant tax relief than its US counterpart (B7). It is 
a telling sign that the promarket proponents of the private system are not upset by this 
perverse redistribution from the poor to the rich! 
Turning to the differences in the reform (plan)s, the American Pillar 1 is planned to 
remain progressive, while the Hungarian one is transformed into a proportional one (D1). 
The reduction of the benefit–contribution ratio in the SS system is planned to be radical in 
the US, but moderate in Hungary (D2). In the US, the contributions to Pillar 2 are planned to 
have a ceiling of $1000 per year, corresponding to 28% of the earning ceiling to SS 
contributions ($25,000 vs. $90,000); in Hungary, there is a common ceiling for both pillars, 
amounting to three times the average gross wage (D3). The reformed US system will fully 
recognize the rights earned in the old system, while the Hungarian one recognizes only those 
  
rights which were gained in the predecessor of the new Pillar 1, namely about 75% of the 
total (D4). Partial recognition was currently proposed by Smetters and Waliser (2004) but 
with a tight age limit. The US combined system is planned to be progressive, while the public 
and private Hungarian benefits are proportional to contributions (D5).  Logically, the US 
reform plans to leave disability insurance fully with the SS, while the Hungarian system 
"included" the corresponding part into Pillar 2 (D6). (The quotation marks refer to the 
perverse solution, that after becoming disabled, any Hungarian worker can return to the 
traditional system.) The US reform requires only a minimal level of annuitization, while the 
Hungarian law correctly insists on a normal one (D7). Due to the low ceiling of the former, 
and the high ceiling of the latter, this difference is unimportant. Finally, in the US, 





At the end of the paper, we draw four conclusions. 
1.  The partial privatization of a mature and universal public system is possible and 
judging by the share of voluntary joiners, can be quite popular. In the age of our 
computerized world, even small firms can direct the monthly private 
contributions of their workers to various funds and the well-developed pension 
funds are able to invest these relatively small contributions efficiently. 
2.  The downsizing of the benefit of the remaining public pillar (the parametric 
reform) is also feasible and helps the transition. But the British experience 
demonstrates that if it is excessive, then such a policy creates tremendous 
tensions and leads to the spread of means-tested assistance, undermining 
voluntary private savings. 
3.  The partial privatization of the SS system weakens the insurance provided by the 
system in all fields, diminishing the life-annuitized part of the benefit and 
increasing the risks associated with disability and survivorship. 
4.  Partial privatization is possible but it is not worthwhile, especially not worthwhile 
in a country like the US, where the richer half of the workers already has 
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